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Abstract 
This article analyzes the Association of Southeast Asian Nation’s (ASEAN) interactions 
with China over the South China Sea issue since the end of the Cold War. A neo-realist 
understanding of ASEAN’s international relations is advanced.  This approach highlights 
the degree of security maximizing interest convergence between key ASEAN actors and 
an extra-regional actor, the United States, to explain the varying outcomes in the 
empirical record. Our approach is contrasted to alternatives in the existing literature 
that either over-emphasize or under-emphasize ASEAN’s autonomy in regional politics.      
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Introduction 
 
A notable development in Asian international relations studies since the end of the Cold 
War has been the development of a significant body of theoretical literature to explain 
the evolution of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Thus, analysts 
have debated whether ASEAN is a security community (Acharya, 2009a, 2009b, 2012; 
Emmerson, 2012; Khoo, 2015); engaged in theoretical reflections on the relevance of 
non-material as opposed to material determinants in regional affairs (Jones and Smith, 
 2 
2006, 2007a, 2007b; Peou, 2002); and considered whether the region or the state is the 
appropriate level of analysis (Ba, 2009; Jones, 2012; Jones and Smith, 2006, 2007a, 
2007b). This article continues this debate. Its point of departure is the claim that while 
the analysts cited above have considerably advanced the theoretical debate on the role 
of ASEAN in regional politics, a gap remains. In particular, theorists have tended to 
adopt unnecessarily polarized positions on ASEAN’s autonomy in regional politics. On 
one hand, an identifiable group of theorists, associated with constructivist theory, have 
emphasized the organization’s autonomy from external interference (Acharya, 2009a, 
2009b, 2012; Ba, 2009).  On the other, theorists of a realist and critical theory 
persuasion, contend that ASEAN has highly circumscribed autonomy from external 
interference (Jones, 2012; Jones and Smith, 2006, 2007a, 2007b). What has not been 
sufficiently explored is the conceptual space that examines the relationship between 
regional states and extra-regional states.  
 
This article attempts to do precisely this, with reference to a case study of ASEAN’s 
policy on the South China Sea since the end of the Cold War. It is our contention that 
ASEAN’s record on the South China Sea is not adequately explained by reference to 
existing perspectives. Instead, we seek to advance an alternative explanation, rooted in 
neo-realist theory, and to develop a theory of regional politics, which involves the 
interaction between ASEAN as an organization and the ASEAN vanguard state(s), in 
respect to the South China Sea issue. According to this vanguard state theory, ASEAN’s 
autonomy is a contingent one, reflecting the interests of what we call a vanguard state 
and an extra-regional state, in this case, the United States (U.S.). Thus, ASEAN’s travails 
with China over the South China Sea are a reflection of its vanguard states’ inability to 
secure external great power actor guarantees to counter China’s territorial advances. To 
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the extent ASEAN has made some limited progress in defending its regional autonomy 
from China’s intervention since 2013, it is a consequence of a convergence of interests 
between its vanguard states and an external actor, the United States, all of whom have 
agency.  
 
Contending Explanations 
 
There are three existing explanations that are relevant to explaining ASEAN’s policy on 
the South China Sea since the end of the Cold War. The first of these approaches, 
represented by the constructivist perspective, has emphasized ASEAN’s ability to 
uphold the principle of regional autonomy from external interference by external 
powers (Acharya, 2009a, 2009b, 2012; Ba, 2009; Haacke, 2003).  A second approach, 
reflected in the realist school, takes a contrary stance.  According to this view, ASEAN 
has severely limited ability to uphold regional autonomy from external interference 
(Jones & Smith, 2002, 2006, 2007a, 2007b, Leifer, 1991, 1999, 2000). A third approach, 
associated with critical theory, also views ASEAN’s autonomy as limited, but in a 
different way from realists.  Here, outcomes are contingent on intra-state struggle 
between socio-political forces (Jones, 2012). As our analysis will show, each of these  
explanations has limitations. In this article we offer an alternative understanding, 
rooted in realist theory, where ASEAN’s autonomy is highly dependent on the 
convergence of interests between ASEAN and an external actor. 
 
 
The Constructivist Argument 
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Central to the constructivist view is the belief that norms coordinate values among 
states (Acharya, 2009a, p. 26). In this view, norms are mutually reinforcing and 
mutually constituted (Acharya, 2009a, p. 26). Thus, Haacke (2003, p. 7) contends that 
ASEAN norms help to ‘build trust in the interaction context among ASEAN leaders and 
to promote interstate and regional stability’. A strong theme in the constructivist 
literature is the claim that despite challenges, ASEAN has successfully upheld the norm 
of regional autonomy. Thus, Acharya (2009a, p. 62) highlights the growing importance 
of the regional autonomy norm during the Cold War period, when the ‘need for greater 
self-reliance in managing the region’s security problems emerged as a key ASEAN 
norm’. For Ba (2009, pp. 11-12), ASEAN’s founding narrative about its relationship to 
intervention and the need for unity has pointed ‘states towards regional, Southeast 
Asian [italics in text] solutions in response to insecurity’. 
 
These authors concede that the South China Sea dispute has tested ASEAN’s norms. For 
Ba (2009, p. 161), the South China Sea dispute ‘would in fact become the defining issue 
of ASEAN-China relations in the 1990s’.  Similarly, Haacke (2003, pp. 122-123) argues 
that China, in seeking to enforce its territorial claims, has appeared to challenge 
ASEAN’s norms on the non-use of force and restraint. Acharya (2009a, p. 157) admits 
that the South China Sea dispute ‘posed a serious test of ASEAN’s unity and of its norms 
concerning the peaceful settlement of disputes’. However, all authors see ASEAN as 
upholding its norms, and maintaining its autonomy. For Haacke (2003, p. 126, p. 125), 
China has ‘incrementally allowed discussions on the Spratlys to deepen’, and ASEAN has 
‘succeeded in allaying the remaining fears of the Chinese about the purpose of ASEAN’s 
multilateral venture[s]’. For Ba (2009, pp. 176-177), ASEAN rejected traditional 
alliances and security arrangements when confronted by China’s challenge to ASEAN on 
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the South China Sea dispute. Success has accompanied ASEAN’s focus on socializing 
China through an enhanced security dialogue based on existing ASEAN frameworks, 
notably the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) (Ba, 2009; Johnston, 1999; Johnston, 2008). 
Indeed, Acharya (2009a, p. 211) states that since the mid-1990s, China began ‘to take a 
more supportive role in multilateralism and the ARF’. Specifically, ‘ASEAN was able to 
secure an agreement from Beijing to conduct Sino-ASEAN multilateral consultations on 
security issues’ (Acharya, 2009a, p. 158). In this view, ‘China has come to acknowledge 
the usefulness of the ARF as the only multilateral venue available to it where it can 
discuss and share its security concerns and approach with Asia-Pacific countries’ 
(Acharya, 2009a, p. 211). Accordingly, ASEAN can ‘claim some success in dealing with 
China on the Spratlys issue’ (Acharya, 2009a, p. 158).  
 
The foregoing claims are difficult to reconcile with actual record of Sino-ASEAN 
interaction on the South China Sea issue (Taylor, 2011). ASEAN’s multilateral diplomacy 
at the ARF and related ASEAN fora has consistently failed to make substantive headway 
on the dispute. Instead of ASEAN’s norms socialising China, or enhancing regional unity, 
China has succeeded in dividing the ASEAN states and advancing its position in the 
South China Sea.  Significantly, in 2012, the ASEAN states were unable to reach an 
agreement on the South China Sea, and failed to issue a joint communiqué for the first 
time in its history (Zhang, 2015, p. 74). More importantly, ASEAN’s maritime 
sovereignty continues to be violated by China (International Crisis Group, 2012b). To 
counter this, regional states have increasingly sought external power security 
guarantees, most notably from the United States (Tan, 2011, p. 149). This leads us to 
examine other perspectives to explain ASEAN’s record on regional autonomy.           
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The Realist Argument 
 
Realist scholars take a very different view of ASEAN regional autonomy.  According to 
Leifer (2000, p. 108), the ASEAN aphorism of ‘regional solutions for regional problems’ 
is more ‘a slogan serving a particular interest than an operational policy accepted and 
applied on a regional basis in any common interest’. In this view, the underlying 
behaviour of ASEAN actually conforms to the realist power-politics model (Jones and 
Smith, 2002, p.102). According to Jones, Khoo and Smith (2013, p. 111), ‘actual 
resolution of the South China Sea dispute remained stalemated in the ARF’s preferred 
strategy of managing problems rather than solving them’. This stalemate ‘serves China’s 
rather than ASEAN’s long term strategic interest’ (Jones, Khoo & Smith, 2013, p. 111). 
Rather than pursuing cooperative security through the ARF, there has been a ‘classic 
recourse to hedging by weaker ASEAN states in an area of growing great power rivalry’ 
(Jones, Khoo & Smith, 2013, p. 112). The dispute therefore demonstrates ‘how more 
powerful actors can manipulate ASEAN’s pliable norms to advance grand strategic 
interests’ (Jones, Khoo & Smith, 2013, p. 113).   
 
For Leifer (1999, p. 7, p. 8), a major problem is that in addition to a ‘lack of political will’ 
to resolve the dispute, there is an ‘absence of any regional machinery for addressing the 
complex contention’ in the South China Sea. Leifer (1999, p. 8) argues that the South 
China Sea issue ‘is symptomatic of the problem of regional order in a strategically-fused 
East and South East Asia, which lacks a security architecture’. Ultimately, Leifer doubts 
ASEAN’s capability to effectively deal with the South China Sea dispute. Instead, ‘the role 
of the United States remains critical’ (Leifer, 1991, p. 135). In this view, ‘regional 
security would seem to require that such countervailing power, if it cannot be 
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generated locally on a cooperative basis, should be available from an acceptable 
external source for which there is only one candidate’ (Leifer, 1991, p. 135). 
 
Realist scholars offer a strong counter argument to the constructivist view. ASEAN 
regional institutions have demonstrably been incapable of resolving the South China 
Sea dispute.  Instead, China has succeeded in dividing the ASEAN states, and utilized the 
existing institutional incoherence for its strategic advantage. These analysts’ emphasis 
on the role of an external actor, the U.S., is indeed a necessary one. China’s gains in the 
South China Sea have been predicated on an insufficiently robust U.S. response (Jones 
and Smith, 2007b, p. 179). However, while the role of external powers remains a critical 
factor in the story, the fact is that regional states possess a greater capacity to secure 
their own interests than has been acknowledged by the realists cited above. In 
theoretical terms, ASEAN states have greater autonomy, and hence state power, than 
they currently allow for. As our analysis will show, particularly in the post-2013 period, 
the Philippines and Vietnam have actively sought, and partially secured, security 
commitments from the U.S., and a variety of external powers including Japan and India. 
This aspect of regional dynamics requires further theorising, which we will offer in our 
alternative explanatory model. 
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The Critical Theory Argument       
 
Adopting a critical theoretical approach, Jones (2012) attempts to advance a 
perspective where regional autonomy is highly circumscribed, but in ways that depart 
from the realist understanding. For Jones (2012, p. 2), external ‘intervention and the 
non-interference principle can be explained as the outcome of struggles between and 
within ASEAN’s most powerful social forces’. For Jones (2012, p. 8), sovereignty and 
non-interference can be analyzed as a ‘technology of power’ mechanism, which is used 
by domestic groups within ASEAN to determine the scope of political conflict in a way 
that best suits their needs. Because of this ‘intimate relationship between sovereignty 
and social order’, sovereignty is always subject to contestation by socio-political forces 
(Jones, 2012, p. 11). In the context of domestic conflict, the state and its institutions are 
subject to capture by the owners of capital. Once capture is effected, the state, by 
invoking the non-interference norm, is able to contain socio-political conflict and 
exclude outside influences that may wish to aid alternative social groups. Thus, at the 
international level, non-interference can be invoked or discarded to suit particular state 
interests or strategies (Jones, 2012, p. 8). This explains the mixed record in Southeast 
Asia, of sovereignty violation and the inconsistent adherence to the norm of non-
interference.   
 
The critical theory perspective is unable to adequately account for the empirical record 
of Sino-ASEAN South China Sea interactions. In two important respects, the South China 
Sea dispute represents a direct challenge to the view that sovereignty is contingent 
upon the role of ASEAN domestic forces. First, the dispute involves key external powers, 
most notably China and the United States. The interaction of these states with regional 
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powers is integral to any analysis of the conflict. Second, it is not clear what impact, if 
any, ASEAN domestic groups have had on the conflict. This raises serious questions 
about the relevance of the critical theory approach to an analysis of this central issue in 
ASEAN’s post-Cold War international relations.  
 
Vanguard State Theory1 
 
Our analysis seeks to advance a fourth perspective, where state autonomy, and an 
intense concern with avoiding sovereignty violation, reflects a deeper concern with 
state survival (Krasner, 1999, Mann, 1984; Waltz, 1979). In this very important sense, 
autonomy, sovereignty, and state survival are reflected in the pursuit of interest 
convergence between ASEAN states and external great powers. The emphasis in this 
article on interests reflects the authors’ self-identification as realists. Consistent with a 
realist theoretical approach, we draw on a realist understanding of how interests are 
defined, in its capacity as a theory of foreign policy (Elman, 1996). Following the work 
of Krasner (1978, p. 12), for analytical purposes, states are analysed in this article as 
unitary rational actors, pursuing aims understood in terms of the national interest.  
 
Interests enjoy a venerable tradition within the realist literature, where there exists a 
consistent view of the basic state interest, which is state survival.2 When a state must 
act to ensure its survival, this constrains a state’s consideration of broader interests 
(Zakaria, 1998, p. 186). This corresponds to Wolfers’ (1962, pp. 13-14) analogy of state 
action under conditions of high threat. For example, classical realist Hans Morgenthau 
(1967, p. 10) argues that ‘the state has no right to let its moral disapprobation of the 
infringement of liberty get in the way of successful political action, itself inspired by the 
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moral principle of national survival’. Similarly, neorealist Kenneth Waltz (1979, p. 134) 
believes that ‘states strive to secure their survival’ and ‘that by comparing nations and 
corporations, the elusive notion of national interest is made clear’. John Mearsheimer 
(2001, p. 31) reaffirms this view, stating that ‘survival is the primary goal of great 
powers’. This statement can be generalized to non-great powers. As Elman (1996, p. 31) 
notes, ‘because of their diminished capabilities relative to others, small states lack a 
margin for time and error---they must be closely attuned to the external environment 
because their survival is at stake and the costs of being exploited are high’. Indeed, it is a 
fairly solid consensus among neorealist scholars that the foreign policy of non-great 
powers, including small states, will reflect system-level constraints (Elman, 1996, p.31).  
Of course, survival is not always at stake. During periods of relative peace, states ‘have 
the “luxury” of choosing their interests and goals’ (Zakaria, 1998, p. 186). During such 
times, a range of other values will be sought, including ‘rank, respect, material 
possessions and material privileges’ (Wolfers, 1952, p. 489).  
 
Clearly, varying degrees of interest convergence are possible, and interests can change 
over time. Partial interest convergence between an ASEAN state and external actor is 
unlikely to elicit the high levels of sustained cooperation required to cause ASEAN state 
resistance to sovereignty violation. Typically, a high level of interest convergence is 
required to elicit the level of cooperation required to resist violations to state 
sovereignty. Also, interest convergence is a dynamic process, where small states 
actively seek ‘maximum great-power commitment to their security interests while 
trying to minimise the price of obtaining that support’ (Ciorciari, 2010, p. 2). Small 
states act in this manner because they ‘generally lack formidable independent power 
capabilities’, and as such, ‘cannot affect the international security landscape on their 
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own’ (Ciorciari, 2010, p. 1). However, because some small states ‘occupy strategic 
positions’, they can ‘affect the overall global distribution of power by adding to the 
resources of some great powers and constraining others’ (Ciorciari, 2010, p. 1). 
 
Engaging with this literature, our analysis begins with the underlying premise that the 
study of interest convergence can yield utility to the field of Southeast Asian 
international relations. The ASEAN vanguard states under consideration, the 
Philippines and Vietnam, are at once highly vulnerable and lodged in a strategic 
location.  They have a clear interest in establishing interest convergence with the U.S., to 
resist China’s advances. Indeed, as this study will seek to show, without external actor 
interest convergence, these states have had great difficulty resisting sovereignty 
violations from China. During periods of decreased interest convergence, this study 
shares the same expectations as Leifer and Jones and Smith, and is consistent with 
existing realist literature. However, when a clear interest convergence occurs between 
an ASEAN state and an external power, a substantial compact is constructed. At this 
time, an ASEAN vanguard state has an active and substantial role in resisting 
sovereignty violations from other external powers. In short, contra the existing realist 
view, an ASEAN vanguard state has substantial agency, and plays the important and 
necessary function of actively seeking and supporting a great power commitment to 
regional policies, or phrased differently, intervention in regional affairs. At the same 
time, contrary to the constructivist view, this agency is highly qualified.  
  
 To understand and explain ASEAN’s record on the South China Sea, our analysis 
advances a perspective, which we call vanguard state theory. A ‘vanguard state’ is 
conceptualized as an ASEAN state, which comes to the fore of the Association when it 
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has vital interests at stake that it wishes to defend (Crawford, 2003, pp. 30-31; Press, 
2005, pp. 25-28). Crawford (2003, p. 31) defines vital interests as involving ‘self-
preservation, political independence, and, by extension, defence of strategically vital 
areas’. Similarly, Press (2005, p. 26) defines vital interests as preservation of 
‘sovereignty’.  Secondary interests can vary greatly, and may range ‘from very important 
interests, such as maintaining trade routes, the safety of your allies, and even national 
“prestige”, to much more ephemeral ones’ (Crawford, 2003, p. 31).  Interests pertaining 
to national self-preservation logically must take precedence. This is because weak states 
have, ‘less room for choice in the decision-making process. Their smaller margin of 
error and hence greater preoccupation with survival makes the essential interests of 
weak states less ambiguous’ (Handel, 1981, p. 3). 
 
Vanguard state behaviour is logically understood as a staged process involving first the 
maximization of security (Waltz, 1979, p. 134), and only then the maximization of 
power (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 33). An ASEAN state only begins to assume the role of 
vanguard state when vital interests are at stake, when state security is threatened. The 
theory does not preclude more than one ASEAN state from assuming the role of 
vanguard state. However, states must have compelling interests at stake in a given 
issue, and there must be some degree of coordination between them. Once a vanguard 
state has come to prominence, it will perform two major functions, which reflect an 
external balancing logic (Waltz, 1979, p. 168). First, because it lacks ‘formidable 
independent power capabilities’ (Ciorciari, 2010, p. 1), the vanguard state will actively 
seek out an external power whose interests align with its own. Second, the vanguard 
state will seek to portray a united ASEAN front in support of its interests, by engaging 
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and mobilizing states within the institution. At this time, an ASEAN vanguard state has 
an active and substantial role in resisting sovereignty violations from external powers.  
 
Critically, there must be an external power that is sufficiently interested in regional 
affairs. Here, the external power must have identifiable interests and be willing to act on 
those interests. There are a number of different strategies at a vanguard state’s disposal 
to engage an external power, establishing an alignment of interests. These include the 
development of bilateral diplomatic interactions, various types of military co-operation, 
and the development of economic ties. A vanguard state may subsequently move to 
further solidify interest convergence with other regional states. The upshot is that 
without a substantial interest convergence, ASEAN is unable to resist violations to it 
sovereignty, and its autonomy will be increasingly compromised. In the subsequent 
sections, we will seek to show an increasing partial alignment of interests between the 
two vanguard states, the Philippines and Vietnam, and the external actor, the United 
States. In fact, it is the partial nature of interest alignment that explains the ineffective 
response by ASEAN to Chinese policy on the South China Sea issue.  
 
Vanguard State Theory: The Philippines, Vietnam and the United States 
 
From 1992 to 2012, ASEAN’s policy on the South China Sea is explained by its inability 
to establish a robust convergence of interest with the U.S., the only state that has the 
wherewithal to seriously counter China. In this sense, this part of the narrative is an 
examination of policy failure. Accordingly, this is also the period when China has made 
sustained advances in its position in the South China Sea. A clear turning-point occurred 
in the period beginning in 2013, with the emergence of a more robust U.S. interest in 
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dealing with the South China Sea issue. The subsequent convergence of interest 
between the Philippines, Vietnam, and the United States has served as the basis for 
pushback against China in the South China Sea.      
 
ASEAN’s Failure, 1992-2012 
 
The South China Sea issue was not an inactive one during the Cold War (Valencia, 
1995). However, in the post-Cold War era, the issue has taken on a new impetus, 
particularly in Chinese foreign policy. Two reasons explain this. First, like all great 
powers, China seeks to control its immediate regional space to the extent that 
circumstances allow. China has done this by projecting its power into the East China and 
South China Sea (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 376). Second, China has become a net importer 
of petroleum in 1993, emerging as the second largest importer in 2009 (behind the 
U.S.). The possibility of untapped oil in the seabed of the South China Sea has raised the 
stakes. This would easily explain a law passed by China’s National People’s Congress in 
1992, in which Beijing asserted its claims to the South China Sea, with the implicit 
threat to use force to enforce these claims (Tan, 2011, p. 147).  
 
In any case, the period from late 1994 to 1995 saw China occupying the contested 
Mischief Reef area, building structures in an area claimed by the Philippines. A variety 
of actors ranging from Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam have 
maintained counter-claims to China’s, adding to the intractability of the issue. In 1996, 
China ratified the United Nations’ Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), but 
opted out of its dispute settlement mechanism. After a period of relative calm following 
the signing of the 2002 Declaration of Conduct on the South China Sea, these maritime 
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disputes have emerged as an even more serious regional security issue.  In 2008, an 
agreement signed by China, the Philippines and Vietnam to conduct a joint seismic 
survey of disputed areas in the South China Sea lapsed (International Crisis Group, 
2012b, pp. 6-7). 
 
Against the backdrop of the failure to achieve noticeable progress on the South China 
Sea disputes, in May 2009, Malaysia and Vietnam made a joint submission to UNCLOS 
on their territorial claims in the South China Sea. In response, China submitted a map to 
UNCLOS that appeared to assert Chinese sovereignty over most of the South China Sea, 
including not only land features, but also the waters inside the line.3 These conflicting 
claims focused regional attention on the July 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi. At 
the meeting, the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared freedom of navigation in 
the South China Sea to be a U.S. ‘national interest’, and called for the peaceful settlement 
of maritime disputes based on UNCLOS (Lander, 2010). In response, Chinese Foreign 
Minister Yang Jiechi responded with what one U.S. official described as ‘a twenty-five-
minute stem-winder that shook the meeting’ (Bader, 2012, p. 105). Yang countered that 
Secretary Clinton’s comments, ‘were, in effect, an attack on China’ (Bader, p. 105). Yang, 
who reportedly was ‘staring directly at Secretary Clinton for much of the time’, declared 
‘China is a big country. Bigger than any other countries here’ (Bader, p, 105).  Since this 
incident, there has been a marked deterioration in Sino-ASEAN relations over the South 
China Sea.  
 
In the absence of a direct and forceful response by the U.S., China has made significant 
advances in extending its control over the South China Sea from 2010-12. In September 
2010, the Chinese government seized a Vietnamese shipping vessel in the vicinity of the 
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Paracel Islands. At the ASEAN Defence Minister’s Meeting (ADMM) Plus Eight Meeting in 
Hanoi in mid-October 2010, Vietnam placed the issue of the South China Sea territorial 
disputes on the agenda for discussion. While no actual progress was achieved at the 
meeting, this act itself was a direct challenge to China. Beijing has consistently refused a 
multilateral approach to the dispute, insisting instead on settling claims bilaterally. 
China’s subsequent disputes with the Philippines and Vietnam intensified. In March 
2011, a standoff occurred when a Filipino vessel was conducting a seismic survey in the 
natural gas-rich Reed Bank in the Spratly Islands. Manila claimed that four similar 
skirmishes occurred between April and May. The Aquino government subsequently 
began referring to the South China Sea as the ‘West Philippine Sea’ (International Crisis 
Group, 2012b, p. 7).  
 
In July 2011, ASEAN and China agreed to a set of guidelines for implementing the 2002 
Sino-ASEAN DOC on the South China Sea. In January 2012, a meeting led to the 
establishment of four working groups to explore marine environmental co-operation, 
marine scientific research, search and rescue operations, and ways to combat 
transnational crime. However, at the same time that Beijing appeared to embrace a 
more accommodating stance, it was also prepared to respond robustly to defend its 
interests. Another standoff occurred between Chinese and Filipino naval vessels over 
the Scarborough shoal in the Spratly Island chain in April-May 2012, with  China out-
manoeuvring the Philippines. With a typhoon approaching, both sides agreed to 
withdraw from the area. The Chinese quickly returned to occupy the shoal in June, 
claiming ownership without firing a shot. Meanwhile, China protested Vietnam’s 
passage of a June 2012 maritime law declaring sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly 
Islands. In that same month, China unilaterally established a municipality called Sansha 
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(three sandbanks in Chinese) in the South China Sea, with Yongxing (or Woody) island 
serving as the administrative hub. According to the official Chinese Xinhua news agency, 
Sansha’s jurisdiction extends over 13 square kilometres of land and 2 million square 
kilometres of surrounding water, effectively establishing Chinese control over much of 
the South China Sea (Associated Press, 2012). In a direct challenge to Vietnam, the China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) invited bids for a new batch of oil 
exploration blocks, some of which were within the 200 nautical mile limit that Vietnam 
claims as its exclusive economic zone.  
 
Events came to a head in July 2012, when ASEAN failed to release a Joint Communiqué 
following the forty-fifth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. This was the first time in the 
Association’s forty-five year history that this had occurred. Both the Philippines and 
Vietnam requested that the joint statement include references to their maritime 
disputes with China.  The Philippines wanted to include an objection to the deployment 
of Chinese paramilitary vessels in Scarborough Shoal (Thayer, 2013, p. 78). Vietnam 
wanted to include an objection to China’s announcement that it would lease oil blocks 
that fell within Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone (Thayer, 2013, p. 78). However, 
Cambodia’s foreign minister Hor Nam Hong, as ASEAN chair, blocked any mention of the 
dispute, claiming that these were bilateral issues and should therefore not be included 
(Thayer, 2013, p. 78). At the November East Asian Summit, also held in Phnom Penh, 
Cambodia and China again tried to neutralize debate over the South China Sea dispute. 
Chairing the Summit once more, Cambodia unilaterally announced that ASEAN had 
agreed with China that ‘they would not internationalize the South China Sea’, and focus 
instead on ‘the existing ASEAN-China mechanisms’ (Bland, 2012). If anything, the ability 
of ASEAN and China to reach an accommodation on the South China Sea dispute has 
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declined after the ascension of a new Chinese leader, Xi Jinping in late 2012 
(International Crisis Group, 2015).  
 
Turning Point: Enter the U.S.  
 
To the extent that the narrative in the pre-2013 period is a case study of policy failure, 
developments since then represent an attempt to reverse this situation. Interestingly, 
ASEAN’s recent relative success in the South China Sea is explained by the U.S.’s 
increasing intervention, which has been actively sought by the Philippines and Vietnam, 
in their capacity as ASEAN vanguard states. Let us review the evidence.  
 
In the face of a perceived threat from China to their territorial interests in the South 
China Sea, Hanoi and Manila have increased co-operation with a more engaged U.S. In 
July 2013, during President Truong Tan Sang’s visit to the White House, the U.S. and 
Vietnam signed a comprehensive strategic partnership. In their joint statement, both 
leaders, ‘reaffirmed their support for the settlement of disputes by peaceful means in 
accordance with international law’, and ‘the principle of the non-use of force of threat-
of-force in resolving territorial and maritime disputes’ (White House Press Secretary, 
2013). For its part, the Aquino government has reinvigorated the Philippines’ once 
estranged military relationship with the U.S. In July 2013, Manila and Washington 
started negotiations on the establishment of a rotational air and naval agreement that 
allows for an increased U.S. military presence (Bradsher, 2013).  
 
In August 2013, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel held talks with President Aquino on 
this topic (Zhou, 2013). In December 2013, Secretary of State Kerry made high-profile 
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stopovers in Hanoi and Manila, announcing increases in U.S. military aid to both. While 
in Hanoi, Secretary Kerry commented on China’s 23 November declaration of an Aerial 
Defence Identification Zone in the East China Sea, advising Beijing that ‘the zone should 
not be implemented, and China should refrain from taking similar unilateral actions 
elsewhere, particularly in the South China Sea’ (Associated Press, 2013). The more 
robust U.S. response was backed up by action. On 28 April 2014, the Philippines’ 
Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin and U.S. Ambassador Philip Goldberg signed a ten-
year Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) at Camp Aquinaldo, Quezon 
City. When approved by the Filipino Supreme Court, the agreement will allow for U.S. 
use of the Philippines’ Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Bay (Eilperin, 2014).  
 
Subsequent developments involving Vietnam were to heighten Hanoi’s sense of a need 
to align itself more strongly with the U.S. Just ahead of the 24th ASEAN Summit in 10-11 
May 2014, regional stability took a turn for the worse. Tensions in the Sino-Vietnamese 
relationship escalated. Just prior to the summit, in what must have been a long-planned 
operation, the Chinese state-owned China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) 
towed in a giant 40 storey tall drilling rig to a potential drilling site in the Paracel 
Islands. These islands are claimed by China and Vietnam, but occupied by China since 
1974. A Chinese convoy accompanied the rig. It is unclear as to which side started the 
ramming, but in the ensuing scuffle, both sides’ ships were subject to assault. 
Vietnamese anger spilled over into physical attacks on Chinese workers in Vietnam. 
More than 3000 Chinese workers had to be evacuated by the Chinese embassy in Hanoi 
and its consulate in Ho Chi Minh City (Perlez, 2014). Unconfirmed reports suggest that 
four persons (at least one of whom was Chinese) were killed, and one hundred and 
thirty-five wounded. U.S. State Department spokeswoman Jennifer Psaki characterized 
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the Chinese action as a ‘unilateral action that appears to be part of a broader pattern of 
Chinese behaviour to advance claims over disputed territory in a manner that 
undermines peace and stability in the region’ (Dyer and Sevastopulo, 2014). The 
Vietnamese response was to come later, seen in a direct challenge to the Chinese claims 
in the South China Sea, both on the basis of international law, and in enhanced relations 
with the U.S., India and Japan.4  
 
At the May 2014 ASEAN Summit, and unlike the meeting in Phnom Penh 2012, the 
ASEAN foreign ministers issued a statement expressing their ‘serious concerns over the 
ongoing developments in the South China Sea, which have increased tensions in the 
area’ (ASEAN, 2014). The issue came to a head with a more targeted U.S. intervention. 
At the annual IISS Shangri-la meeting on 31 May, U.S. Secretary of Defense Hagel gave 
voice to regional concerns by directly critiquing Chinese policy (Hagel, 2014). Hagel 
noted that ‘the U.S. will not look the other way when fundamental principles of the 
international order are being challenged’ (Hagel, 2014). The Chinese response was 
unequivocal. In his presentation, the Chinese representative, Lieutenant General Wang 
Guanzhong, deputy chief of general staff of the People’s Liberation Army, strongly 
contested Hagel’s views (Wang, 2014). 
 
Evidence of diplomatic U.S.-Filipino-Vietnamese co-ordination on the South China Sea 
issue became increasingly apparent. And, China has responded. In what must surely 
have been previously discussed between the Philippines and the U.S., Manila has 
followed up on its initial 22 January 2013 submission to the United Nation’s Permanent 
Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague that protested China’s territorial claims in the 
South China Sea. On 30 March 2014, a 4000-page dossier was formally submitted. The 
 21 
aforementioned PCA set a 15 December 2014 cut off date for the consideration of 
competing territorial claims in the South China Sea. A flurry of well-timed activity was 
in evidence prior to that date. On 5 December, even as Manila announced a spike in 
Chinese building activity in the Scarborough Shoal, the U.S. State Department released a 
paper challenging Chinese claims in the South China Sea (U.S. State Department, 2014). 
This was followed on 7 December by China’s release of a position paper contesting the 
Philippines’ claims. Beijing’s claims were backed up by a declaration of intent by their 
State Oceanic Administration to bolster China’s surveillance capacity in the South China 
Sea by 2020 (Straits Times, 2014). On 11 December, Vietnam stated that it had 
submitted its own position paper to the PCA. Hanoi expressed support for Manila’s 
position, questioned China’s claims, and asked the tribunal to consider Vietnam’s 
interests in the matter under consideration (Heydarian, 2014). 
 
Chinese strategy has evolved, even as the U.S. has displayed an increasing resolve to 
support its ASEAN partners. U.S. satellite imagery of the South China Sea has established 
that from May 2014 to April 2015, the Chinese have been actively ‘constructing’ land at 
the following reefs: Cuarteron, Fiery Cross, Gaven, Hughes, Subi, and the Union reefs 
(Johnson South and Johnson North reefs) (Thayer, 2015a). As a consequence, the U.S. 
estimates that China has expanded its territory somewhere in the region of between 
1500 and 2000 acres (Dou and Hookway, 2015). For example, dredging activity at 
Hughes Reef, a shoal in the Spratly Islands, has led to the construction of a 90,000 
square yard island, complete with a helicopter pad, and radar facility. Significantly, a 
satellite photo taken of the same location in March 2014 revealed only a small concrete 
platform at high tide. The U.S. response has been robust. Commander of the U.S. Pacific 
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Fleet, Admiral Harry Harris was quoted as saying that ‘China is creating a great wall of 
sand with dredges and bulldozers’ (Gladstone and Sanger, 2015).  
 
In testimony before a Senate Committee in April 2015, then Commander of U.S. Pacific 
Command, Admiral Samuel Locklear characterized China’s pace of construction in the 
South China Sea as ‘astonishing’ (Tweed, 2015). He further posited that ‘if this activity 
continues at pace, it will give them (China) defacto control of the maritime territory 
they claim’ (Tweed, 2015). Locklear also speculated that this ‘might be a platform if they 
(China) ever wanted, to establish an air defence zone’ in the South China Sea (Tweed, 
2015). U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Daniel Russel also objected to 
Chinese policy. He noted that Chinese ‘reclamation isn't necessarily a violation of 
international law, but it’s certainly violating the harmony, the fengshui of Southeast 
Asia, and, its certainly violating China’s claim to be a good neighbour and a benign and 
non-threatening power’ (Denyer, 2015). 
 
The strong U.S. stand has served as an impetus for ASEAN, and particularly the ASEAN 
vanguard states, to adopt a more steely posture. On 15 April 2015, the Philippines’ 
Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario confirmed that Manila was ‘seeking additional 
support from the United States in terms of being able to take a stronger position in 
defending our position’ (Minh, 2015). At ASEAN’s 26-28 April 2015 Summit in Kuala 
Lumpur, ASEAN’s Vietnamese Secretary General Le Luong Minh strongly contested 
China’s claims in the South China Sea (Otto and Ng, 2015). This was then reinforced by 
the newly-appointed Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, who proceeded to make a 
series of explicit critiques of China’s activities in the South China Sea. On 27 May, Carter 
met the Filipino Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin in Hawaii, where he stressed that 
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the U.S. commitment to defend the Philippines was ‘ironclad’ (Department of Defense, 
2015).  At the annual IISS conference in Singapore from 29-31 May, Carter made clear 
the U.S.’s ‘fundamental interest’ in freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.  He 
reiterated the U.S.’s ‘deep concern at the pace and scope of land reclamation in the 
South China Sea’ (Carter, 2015). Significantly, these are the strongest statements made 
by any official serving in the Obama administration since 2009 (Rosenberg, 2015). 
Carter then travelled to Hanoi in June 2015 to sign a joint mission statement, pledging 
to expand defence trade and to collaborate on maritime security (Lynch, 2015). In late 
June, the Philippines held naval exercises separately with the U.S. and Japan in Filipino-
controlled areas of the South China Sea (Mogato, 2015). In August 2015, after a meeting 
with head of U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Harry Harris Jr., the Philippines’ Defense 
Secretary Voltaire Gazmin vouched for the utility of the U.S. military role in the region. 
Gazmin stated that  ‘if there are Americans flying around there, we won’t be troubled. 
We need to be helped in our resupply missions. The best way they could assist is 
through their presence’ (Gady, 2015). 
 
Vietnam has made similar efforts to seek out U.S. security commitments, and to bolster 
ties with the United States. These have been reciprocated by the U.S., suggesting a 
compelling convergence of interests. Between 6 July and 10 July 2015, the Secretary-
General of the Vietnam Communist Party, Nguyen Phu Trong, made an unprecedented 
visit to the United States. This was the first visit by a serving chief of the Communist 
Party of Vietnam. Obama confirmed that the two had ‘discussed the importance of 
resolving maritime disputes in the South China Sea and throughout the Asia-Pacific in 
accordance with international law’ (White House Press Secretary, 2015a). Similarly, 
Trong confirmed that the two had ‘shared our concern about the recent activities [in the 
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South China Sea] that are not in accordance with international law that may complicate 
the situation’ (White House Press Secretary, 2015a).  
 
While the following might be interpreted as a pro forma statement, the preface to those 
remarks included a joint statement expressing their unequivocal concern at recent 
developments in the South China Sea (White House Press Secretary, 2015a). Other 
Vietnamese officials have driven home the point. Speaking at the Asia Society in New 
York on 28 September 2015, Vietnam’s President Truong Tan Sang commented on 
China’s land reclamation in the South China Sea, which had just been reaffirmed by 
Chinese President Xi in an interview with the Wall Street Journal. Sang claimed that 
‘acts by China seriously affect the maritime safety and security in the East Sea’ and  
‘violate international law’ (Daniszewski and Pennington, 2015). Moreover, Sang had 
warm words for the United States, stating that there is no mistrust between the two 
nations, and that ‘the moment the United States fully lifts the ban on lethal weapons 
sales to Vietnam, [it] will send a signal to the whole world that the Vietnam-U.S. 
relations have been fully normalized’ (Daniszewski and Pennington, 2015).  
 
While China has not directly challenged the U.S. since its articulation of a much clearer 
position on the South China Sea disputes, it has continued to alter the status quo in 
subtle ways. The next Chinese move was to construct a pair of lighthouses on its 
existing territories on Cuareton Reef and Johnson South Reef (Torde, 2015). But, again, 
unlike the pre-2013 period, the U.S. has responded quickly. On 26 October, in a move 
that was justified under the principle of freedom of navigation, the USS Lassen, a guided 
missile destroyer, went inside the twelve nautical mile exclusive economic zone of the 
Spratly islands occupied by China (Lubold, 2015). As the U.S. staked out this more 
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robust posture, on 29 October, the U.N. Arbitral tribunal in The Hague unanimously 
ruled that it had jurisdiction to hear the Philippines’ 2013 submission challenging 
China’s claims in the South China Sea (Deutsch, 2015). This move was welcomed by the 
U.S. and rejected by China.  On 3 November, during a visit to Beijing, Admiral Harris 
presented U.S. activities in the South China Sea as an instance of supporting the 
principle of freedom of navigation, and critically, as unexceptional (Perlez, 2015). In a 
highly symbolic move that backed up Harris’ words, on 5 November, Carter visited the 
U.S. aircraft carrier the USS Theodore Roosevelt, as it traversed the South China Sea. 
During his visit, Carter was quoted to the effect that ‘there is a lot of concern about 
Chinese behaviour out here. Many countries are coming to the United States and asking 
us to do more with them, so that we can keep the peace out here’ (Ferdinando, 2015).  
 
To underline the point, on 8 November, two B-52’s flew near the disputed Spratly 
Islands. And, on his return to the U.S., Secretary Carter expressed in no uncertain terms 
that the U.S. ‘joins virtually everyone else in the region in being deeply concerned about 
the pace and scope of land reclamation in the South China Sea’ (Agence France Presse, 
2015).  In the face of this sustained opposition, the Chinese clarified their stance on the 
South China Sea, even if the fundamental position remained the same. On 7 November, 
Chinese President Xi stated in a speech in Singapore that China was committed to 
freedom of navigation, even as he asserted that the islands in the South China Sea were 
‘China’s since ancient times’ (Wong, 2015).  According to Xi ‘there has been no problem 
with maritime navigation or overland flights, nor will there ever be in the future’ (Wong 
2015). While some might see in that statement a more co-operative stance on maritime 
security, others would just as easily read in it a Chinese commitment to guarantee 
freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, which is not the same thing.     
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In any case, the Philippines is clearly pleased that its efforts to engage the U.S. on the 
South China Sea issue have been successful. Following the USS Lassen episode in the 
Spratly Islands, Philippines President Aquino told a forum hosted by the Foreign 
Correspondents Association of the Philippines on 27 October that he had ‘no issue’ with 
the U.S. move, and that he believed ‘everybody would welcome a balance of power’ in 
the South China Sea (Sabillo, 2015a). Interest convergence between the U.S. and the 
Philippines was further solidified when President Obama met with President Aquino on 
18 November 2015.  Obama stated his desire to ‘reaffirm our [the U.S.’s] unwavering 
commitment to the security and defence of the Philippines’ (Philstar, 2015). He 
confirmed that the U.S. is ‘especially committed to ensuring maritime security in the 
region’, and that it will be increasing ‘maritime security assistance to the Philippines to 
record levels, including two new vessels’ (Philstar, 2015). Obama stated that he and 
Aquino had agreed on the need for ‘bold steps to lower tensions, including pledging to 
halt further reclamation, new construction, and militarisation of disputed areas in the 
South China Sea’ (Philstar, 2015). At the same time, Aquino confirmed that the 
Philippines-U.S. security alliance ‘remains a cornerstone of peace and stability in the 
Asia Pacific’, and reiterated the importance of U.S. contributions to Filipino security, that 
‘help us ensure that we can ably respond to current security challenges, particularly in 
the area of maritime security and maritime awareness’ (White House Press Secretary, 
2015b). Aquino took the opportunity to ‘reiterate the Philippines’ view that the freedom 
of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea must be continuously upheld 
consistent with international law’ (White House Press Secretary, 2015b).  
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Interestingly, there has also been increasing evidence of high-level dialogue between 
the Philippines and Vietnam, which further supports their classification as vanguard 
states. On September 2015, Vietnamese Ambassador to the Philippines Truong Trieu 
Duong stated that the two would ‘deepen…cooperation in order to solve all the issues 
concerning the South China Sea in a most peaceful way in accordance with international 
law’ (Straits Times, 2015). A strategic partnership was signed on 17 November, when 
the two leaders met at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, held in 
Manila. President Truong stated that ‘President [Aquino] and I shared our concerns 
over the recent developments in the East Sea or the South China Sea, affecting trust, 
peace, security and stability in the region. We also reaffirmed the importance of 
ensuring the stability, maritime security, safety and freedom of navigation and of flight 
in the South China Sea’ (Sabillo, 2015b). For his part, Aquino stated that ‘in terms of 
defence relations, we [the Philippines] welcome the active engagement and cooperation 
between our respective defense and military establishments’ (Sabillo, 2015). He 
continued, that ‘as seafaring peoples, we look to initiatives that will enhance our 
capacities to better respond to challenges and situations in our common seas’ 
(Orendain, 2015). As one regional analyst noted, ‘the message is very clear, that China’s 
neighbours are beginning to form an informal alliance’ (Heydarian, cited in Orendain, 
2015). 
 
Objections 
 
There are a number of possible queries, which may be raised to the argument proposed. 
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First, can ASEAN be understood as a unified entity? Drawing on the pioneering work of 
Frederick Frey (1985), we contend that ASEAN can be conceptualised as a unitary actor 
during those periods when ASEAN displays a sufficiently united front in support of 
vanguard state interests. As Frey (1985, p. 144) points out,  ‘absolutely unitary action is 
a naively impractical criterion for a group actor’. However, he argues that if group 
actors ‘display sufficient behavioural cohesion among members so as to produce 
unitary group actor behaviour’, then evidence of minor deviations from cohesion should 
not result in denial of group actor designation (Frey, 1985, p.142). 
 
Relating this discussion to ASEAN, our view is that ASEAN unity is not something to be 
assumed. ASEAN unity waxes and wanes. It develops in specific circumstances. Thus, 
ASEAN can be understood as a unified entity during those periods when ASEAN displays 
a united front in support of a/the vanguard state(s). This occurred during the Cold War, 
when Thailand acted as ASEAN’s vanguard state and established significant interest 
convergence with an external actor, the People’s Republic of China from 1979-91. 
Despite divisions within ASEAN, the organization was sufficiently unified to act as a 
unitary actor in Frey’s terms, and projected an admittedly far from perfect, but still 
cohesive united front. This allowed ASEAN, in cooperation with China, to successfully 
counter Vietnamese policy, a state that had defeated the French, and the U.S. At other 
times, as in the case of the South China Sea dispute investigated here, interest 
convergence, and hence, unity between the vanguard states, the Philippines and 
Vietnam, and the external actor, the U.S., is very much a work in progress. That said, 
interest convergence is strengthening as events in the South China Sea take a turn for 
the worse, with China’s deployment of two missile batteries in the Paracel Islands in 
February 2016 (Brunnstrom and Blanchard, 2016). 
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A second, and related, query is whether Vietnam and the Philippines are merely 
pursuing their own self-interest on the South China Sea. This view, if correct, 
significantly undermines the utility of the vanguard concept, which focuses on the 
interaction between the vanguard state(s) and ASEAN members to explain ASEAN 
policy. Here, it is important to highlight the functions performed by a  ‘vanguard state’.  
An ASEAN vanguard state has a number of interrelated functions: It seeks to set the 
ASEAN agenda, and develop cohesion in support of its interests in the international 
context, whether that be in multilateral forums, or with respect to key external actors. 
How successful, or otherwise, a vanguard state is at performing these functions will 
directly impact its ability to resist sovereignty violation from external actors. To date, in 
the case of the South China Sea issue, there has been some success on the part of Hanoi 
and Manila in working with ASEAN to establish interest convergence with the U.S., an 
external power.  Our argument is that Vietnam and the Philippines need to increasingly 
act in their capacity as vanguard states and focus on developing ASEAN unity, even as 
they seek interest convergence with the U.S. In the event of a failure to do these things, 
they will continue to have their sovereignty undermined by China.    
 
A third query concerns the vanguard states discussed in this article. Do Vietnam and the 
Philippines have a greater propensity for being vanguard states on the South China Sea 
issue? How might the theory be applied to other ASEAN states? According to vanguard 
state theory, a vanguard state is any ASEAN state that has the most compelling interests 
at stake in a given issue. In the case of the South China Sea dispute, this is Vietnam and 
the Philippines. Therefore, these are the vanguard states. Why Vietnam and the 
Philippines and not another ASEAN state?  First, there are only four ASEAN states with 
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competing claims in the South China Sea: Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. 
We would not expect an ASEAN state that did not have a competing sovereignty claim 
with China to have a compelling interest at stake in the dispute. This effectively rules 
out the other ASEAN members. Second, history matters. Malaysia and Brunei 
historically have had more co-operative ties with China than the remaining claimants. 
This will undoubtedly have had an impact on their response to the issue. Thus, these 
states have preferred a non-confrontational approach, largely accommodating China 
(Parameswaran, 2015). Vietnam, on the other hand, has a mixed history of being an 
alliance partner (1950-78) of China’s, as well as having extremely strained relations 
with China. This is reflected in the actual use of military force over the Spratly islands in 
1988, and other lower level, but still real frictions since then.  Similarly, the Philippines 
have traditionally been a U.S. alliance partner since 1951, rather than China. And, as 
documented here, this relationship has deteriorated in recent years (Heydarian, 2015).  
 
A fourth query concerns the external actor with which ASEAN establishes interest 
convergence. It might be queried why we have identified the United States as ASEAN’s 
actor of choice. Why not Japan? It is true that Japan is increasing its interest in Southeast 
Asia, and in particular, regional maritime regional disputes. On 12 May 2015, joint naval 
drills were conducted between Japan and the Philippines in the South China Sea 
(Hayashi, 2015). On 4 June, in direct opposition to Chinese calls, Japan signed an 
agreement to provide naval patrol vessels to the Philippines (Rajagopalan, Takenaka, 
and Wee, 2015). The Japanese–Vietnamese relationship is also strengthening. From 15-
18 September, the Secretary-General of the Vietnam Communist Party Nguyen Phu 
Trong, visited Japan. A Memorandum on Cooperation between Coast Guard Agencies 
was signed. In a joint vision statement, it was declared that both sides ‘share many 
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fundamental interests’ (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015). While Japan has clear 
converging interests with Manila and Hanoi, not least freedom of navigation and 
limiting Chinese power projection ability, the U.S. has even more compelling interests at 
stake, and significantly greater capabilities to effect change on the part of Chinese 
policy. While Japan can assist ASEAN at the margins, it cannot balance Chinese power 
and policy in East Asia. It takes a great power to balance a great power. On this point, it 
is clear that for ASEAN, the U.S. is the preferred partner to counter Chinese policy in the 
South China Sea.   As we argue, this is increasingly occurring. 
 
Finally, has this example of interest convergence improved ASEAN’s security? This is 
ultimately a counterfactual question. We attempt to make a plausible case that ASEAN’s 
security has improved by the actions of the vanguard states. Since we are dealing with a 
counterfactual, we have to compare our present situation to one where China was 
allowed to proceed unopposed with its South China Sea policy.  Our argument is that to 
the extent that the Chinese now face an increasingly active U.S. naval maritime 
presence, and thus acts as a counterbalance in the South China Sea, the answer that 
ASEAN vanguard state actions have improved ASEAN security is yes.    
 
 
Conclusion 
 
A variety of explanations have been offered in the literature to explain ASEAN’s policy 
on the South China Sea. None is totally satisfactory. This article offers an alternative 
explanation rooted in the logic of neo-realist theory, in its capacity as a theory of foreign 
policy. In this interpretation, the Philippines and Vietnam have taken on the dual role of 
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vanguard states in ASEAN’s response to China’s policy in the South China Sea. In the 
pre-2013 period, these states unsuccessfully sought to resist sovereignty violations 
from China. This is because U.S. interests on this issue had not converged sufficiently 
with that of the Philippines and Vietnam. Washington was simply too distracted by 
developments in the Middle East and Northeast Asia, and put Southeast Asia on the 
back-burner. In the post-2013 period, an increasing convergence of interests between 
the U.S. on one hand, and the Philippines and Vietnam on the other, has  led to a  
stronger regional pushback against Chinese policy in the South China Sea. The 
theoretical implications of this case study should be noted. Our study strongly suggests 
that ASEAN’s autonomy is not as unqualified as claimed by constructivist theorists. 
Neither is it as restricted as realist and critical theorists contend. Rather, it is a 
contingent type of autonomy, reflecting an interest convergence between a specific 
ASEAN vanguard state (or states) and an external actor. Agency rests in these parties. 
To highlight one without the other misses an important aspect of what is occurring. 
Power also matters in this process, since only an external great power can balance a 
regional great power.             
 
Looking to the future, absent the continuation of a robust but measured U.S. 
intervention policy, China's control over the South China Sea is a geographical and 
technological inevitability. Thus, the Obama administration's recent policy under 
Ashton Carter is a move in the right direction. That said, the message of vanguard state 
theory is that for this push-back to be sustained, co-ordination and commitment will be 
required on the part of the Philippines, Vietnam, and the U.S. It is also vital that the 
Philippines and Vietnam engage and mobilize the remaining ASEAN members, to 
portray a united ASEAN front. Should this effort falter, vanguard state theory predicts 
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that ASEAN sovereignty will continue to be compromised, and ASEAN’s diplomats will 
labour in vain.    
 
Notes 
 
1. This section contains and expands upon the theoretical argument first outlined 
in Southgate, L. (2015).  ASEAN and the Dynamics of Resistance to Sovereignty 
Violation: The Case of the Third Indochina War (1978-91). Journal of Asian 
Security and International Affairs, 2(2), 200-221.  
2. For a constructivist conception of state interests, see Finnemore, M. (1996). 
National Interests in International Society. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. For 
Finnemore (1996, p. 2), ‘interests are constructed through social 
interaction…[and] are defined in the context of internationally held norms and 
understandings about what is good and appropriate’. For the pluralist 
conception of state interests,  see the summary of that view in Krasner, S. (1984). 
Review: Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical 
Dynamics. Comparative Politics, 16(2), 223-246.  In this view, civil society is 
made up of a ‘plethora of diverse, fluctuating, competing groups of individuals 
with shared interests’ (Krasner, 1984, p. 226). These groups ‘struggle to 
maximize their own, autonomously defined self-interests’ (Krasner, 1984, p. 
226).  
3. The People’s Republic of China has a long-standing claim to the territories in the 
South China Sea, dating back to August 1951. Force has been used by China on a 
number of occasions, most notably against South Vietnam in 1974, and against a 
unified Vietnam in 1988.  
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4. During a state visit by Vietnamese President Truong Tan Sang from 16-19 March 
2014, Tokyo and Hanoi turned their eight-year old ‘Strategic Partnership’ into an 
‘Extensive Strategic Partnership’. In late October 2014, during Vietnamese Prime 
Minister Nguyen Tan Dung’s visit to New Delhi, Vietnam encouraged India to 
support the peaceful resolution of the disputes in the South China. Hanoi also 
encouraged India to deepen its oil exploration activities in the South China Sea. It  
has also established a comprehensive partnership with Australia in 2015 
(Thayer, 2015b).   
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